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INTRODUCTION
The Drexel Law Review Symposium, ERISA at 40: What Were They
Thinking?, held on October 25, 2013, celebrated the forty-year anniversary of ERISA’s passage in 1974.1 Describing the process as a
“decade-long quest to safeguard the retirement savings of American
workers,” the Symposium provided remarkable insight into the political and policy challenges faced by the framers of ERISA.2 By posing the question, “What were they thinking?” to some of the key
participants in ERISA’s enactment, the organizers of the Symposium
sought to create an oral history that captured noteworthy events,
concerns, and developments leading to the passage of ERISA that
otherwise may not have been recorded.3
ERISA established comprehensive changes in the regulation of
private pension plans. These changes were designed to remedy
identified defects in the retirement system believed to limit its overall effectiveness.4 With only 50% of the private, nonagricultural
workforce covered by pension plans at the time, a purported objective of the ERISA legislation was to “promote a renewed expansion
of private retirement plans and increase the number of participants
receiving private retirement benefits.”5
ERISA’s framers, however, recognized that the voluntary characteristic of the private retirement system created a fundamental tension between having stricter coverage rules and the employers’ willingness to offer retirement plans. Therefore, rather than mandating
universal coverage, the drafters chose to address the coverage problem by setting limits that restricted the employers’ ability to exclude
certain workers from their plans, should the employers choose to offer them.6 The framers also chose to continue to rely on the use of
tax incentives as a means of encouraging employers to voluntarily
increase coverage in private retirement plans.7

1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012).
2. Symposium, ERISA at 40: What Were They Thinking?, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 257 (2014).
3. See id.
4. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 1–2 (1973) (discussing the goals of pension reform legislation, including increasing the number of participants in the private retirement system).
5. Id. at 2; see also S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 19 (1973) (“One of the major objectives of the new
legislation is to extend coverage under pension plans more widely.”).
6. See infra Part I (discussing nondiscrimination).
7. See JOHN HEINZ ET AL., S. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, THE EMP. RET. INCOME SEC. ACT OF
1974: THE FIRST DECADE, S. PRT. NO. 98-221, at 30 (1984).
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Since the passage of ERISA, coverage rates in the private retirement system have not changed significantly; however, the retirement savings culture has changed drastically. The predominant plan
type has shifted from the defined benefit plan to the defined contribution plan, resulting in a reallocation between the employer and
the employee of the burdens and risks associated with retirement
savings.8
In defined benefit plans, the employer, rather than the participant,
bears the risk of investment loss; this is because plan assets are
pooled in an aggregate trust, and the participants are guaranteed
pre-determined retirement benefits that are generally based on years
of service and compensation.9 The employer is required to fund the
plan sufficiently to pay the promised benefits—and is liable for
payment—despite the investment performance of the plan assets.10
In contrast, in defined contribution plans there is no single trust;
instead, employers make annual contributions to accounts assigned
to individual participants. At retirement, participants receive the
balance in their accounts. Thus, the success or failure of these savings programs depends on how much has been contributed and
how well the assets have been managed. Because the plan does not
guarantee a specific amount to be paid at retirement, the employee
alone bears the risk of investment loss.11
The cash or deferred arrangement, better known as the 401(k)
plan, represents the fastest growing type of defined contribution
plan and dominates new plan offerings in the private sector.12 In
401(k) plans, employees elect to have portions of their compensation
contributed to a qualified retirement plan, rather than to receive
them as compensation in the year in which they are earned. Participant-directed 401(k) plans additionally require participants to decide the manner in which their accounts are to be invested, including whether, and to what extent, portions of their compensation are

8. See Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA. TAX REV.
607, 613 (2000) [hereinafter Jefferson, Rethinking].
9. Id. at 610–11.
10. See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1310 (2012) (establishing the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, which provides limited insurance when an employer fails to meet its pension
obligations).
11. See Regina T. Jefferson, Redistribution in the Private Retirement System: Who Wins and
Who Loses, 53 HOW. L.J. 283, 301 (2010) [hereinafter Jefferson, Redistribution]; see also Jefferson,
Rethinking, supra note 8, at 612.
12. See Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 302 nn.85 & 87.
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contributed to the plan.13 Having such choices requires 401(k) plan
participants to assume even more of the risks associated with their
retirement savings than other types of defined contribution plans.
Therefore, the dominance of 401(k) plans as primary retirement savings vehicles significantly restructures the retirement savings environment by presenting employees with decision making challenges
that they previously did not face. This development has created the
need to identify new and different ways of accomplishing ERISA’s
goal of maximizing the number of workers who receive meaningful
retirement benefits from the private retirement system in the current
pension landscape.14
This Reflection seeks to respond to this challenge by analyzing
current coverage and participation rates in the private retirement
system, and by proposing methods of achieving a broader and more
equitable distribution of benefits received from 401(k) plans. Specifically, Part I of this Reflection describes and critiques the effectiveness of the existing nondiscrimination standards for encouraging increased coverage in the private retirement system. Part II examines
current trends with respect to various segments of the working
population and concludes that existing pension law and policies are
providing inadequate retirement benefits to low- and middleincome workers participating in 401(k) plans. Part III proposes the
following three recommendations for increasing participation rates
in the current pension climate: (1) mandatory education programs
for all 401(k) plans; (2) mandatory automatic features in 401(k)
plans; and (3) an additional tax incentive to encourage greater participation of low- and middle-income employees, as measured by
their vested accrued benefits.

I. THE COVERAGE CONCEPT
Expanding pension coverage for non-highly compensated workers has long been a goal of federal pension policy.15 The House Ways
and Means Committee Report accompanying the Revenue Act of
13. See Regina Jefferson, Balancing Greater Protection with Individual Choice in 401(k) Plans, in
BEYOND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN UNITED STATES TAX LAW 193, 199 (David A. Brennen et al.
eds., 2013) [hereinafter Jefferson, Balancing].
14. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., General Tax Reform: Panel Discussions Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
93d Cong. 1122–23 (1973) (statement of Prof. Daniel Halperin, Law School, University of
Pennsylvania); see also Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 426–29 (1984) (discussing the history of
the nondiscrimination concept in tax law).
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1942 refers to the function of the nondiscrimination standards as
preventing “the [pension] trust device from being used for the benefit of shareholders, officials, or highly paid employees.”16 Also, in
the Committee on Finance Report accompanying the Comprehensive Private Pension Security Act of 1973, one of the listed goals of
the legislation was to “increase the number of individuals participating in retirement plans.”17 More recently, the Pension Protection
Act of 2006 sought to expand coverage and participation in 401(k)
plans by encouraging automatic enrollment and escalation features.18
Retirement plans that operationally meet the requirements of Internal Revenue Code section 401(a) are said to be “qualified” plans.19
The qualified status of a plan entitles employers as well as plan participants to substantial tax benefits.20 The preferential tax treatment
is justified as a method of encouraging employers to establish and
maintain retirement plans that provide benefits not only to highly
compensated employees, but also to low- and middle-income employees, who may find it difficult to save on their own.21 To ensure
that plans operationally meet this objective and warrant the special
tax treatment they receive, plans must satisfy a set of complex nondiscrimination rules designed to achieve broader coverage.22
By relying on tax incentives, Congress effectively has chosen to
pay a tax subsidy to high-income employees as a means of encouraging employers to establish and maintain plans that also cover
lower-income employees.23 Accordingly, from a pension policy perspective, the tax subsidy for qualified plans is justifiable only if it results in greater retirement savings for low- and middle-income

16. H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 103–04 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 450.
17. S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 1 (1973).
18. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 902, 120 Stat. 780, 1033–40
(2006); see also Jack VanDerhei, The Pension Protection Act and 401(k)s, WALL ST. J., http://
online.wsj.com/ad/employeebenefits-pension_protection_act.html (last visited May 29, 2014).
19. I.R.C. § 401(a) (2012).
20. See discussion infra Section III.C.
21. Subcommittee Hearing on Pension Parity: Addressing the Inequities Between Retirement Plan
Options for Small and Large Businesses: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. and Tax of the H.
Comm. on Small Bus., 110th Cong. 8–9 (2007) (statement of Jim McCarthy, Managing Director,
Retirement Plan Services Morgan Stanley, on behalf of the Securities Industry & Financial
Markets Association).
22. See discussion infra Section I.B.
23. See Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 297–98. The tax subsidy for retirement savings was introduced in the 1920s. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 234(a)(1), 42 Stat. 227, 254
(providing a deduction for business expenses such as “salaries or other [including deferral]
compensation”); see also infra Section III.C. (discussing tax benefits of qualified plans).
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workers.24 Furthermore, as a fiscal policy matter, the ideal subsidy
level should be no greater than is required to cover the additional
costs to the employer for covering low-income workers.25

A. Defining “Coverage” and “Participation”
To prevent abuse of the tax subsidy, the nondiscrimination rules
establish limits on the employer’s ability to disproportionately shift
contributions and benefits to highly compensated employees in
qualified plans.26 Compliance with the rules requires that coverage
and participation rates of highly and non-highly compensated employees be calculated and compared.27 Enforcement of the rules
hinges on a quantifiable level of permitted disparity between the
participation rates for these two classes.28
Although the terms “coverage” and “participation” are essential
to the nondiscrimination concept, they are not used consistently
within the pension community.29 Common usage of the terms generally refers to whether a worker is benefitting from a plan in a given year; however, individuals and entities collecting the data on
coverage and participation rates in the private retirement system often use criteria other than current accruals.30 As a result, coverage
and participation rates in the private retirement system may be misleading, particularly among certain groups.31
24. See, e.g., Norman P. Stein & Patricia E. Dilley, Leverage, Linkage, and Leakage: Problems
with the Private Pension System and How They Should Inform the Social Security Reform Debate, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1369, 1389 (2001) (quoting Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified
Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 433 (1984)) (noting that “[f]rom Congress’s perspective, the optimum level of tax subsidy is that which encourages the establishment of a retirement plan only if the social benefit of the plan equals or
exceeds its costs”).
25. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 410–11 (Robert C.
Clarke ed., 5th ed. 2010).
26. See, e.g., Russell K. Osgood, The Ages and Themes of Income Taxation: Savings and Investments, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 521, 527 (1983) (arguing that because “[n]ondiscrimination does not
flow logically from the deduction provided for contributions . . . [t]he nondiscrimination principle is based on a congressional determination that discrimination against lower paid people
is unfair”).
27. I.R.C. § 401(m) (2012). If 401(k) plans meet one of the design-based safe harbors, they
are deemed to satisfy the “actual deferral percentage” tests, which are the special participation
and nondiscrimination rules for 401(k) plans. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.; see also John Turner et al., Defining Participation in Defined Contribution Pension
Plans, 126 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 36, 36–37 (2003), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/
2003/08/art3full.pdf.
30. See Turner et al., supra note 29, at 36–37.
31. See id. at 37.
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The concepts of “coverage” and “participation” are related but
distinct. Coverage is used to broadly describe a worker’s association
with an employer-sponsored pension plan.32 There are numerous
reasons why a worker may not be associated with a plan sponsored
by his or her employer.33 One reason is that the worker may not be
the type of employee the plan is established to benefit.34 Employers
are permitted to design their plans to exclude certain categories of
employees so long as they satisfy the nondiscrimination rules.35
Thus, for example, it is common practice for employers to differentiate plan offerings based on factors such as whether an employee is
salaried or paid hourly, or geographic location.36
Another reason a worker may not be associated with a plan is because the worker is not “participating” in the plan.37 The term “participation,” used in this context, refers to whether or not a worker is
actually benefiting from a plan in a given year.38 Thus, workers can
be covered by a plan while not participating in it. This situation
generally occurs when a worker, although a member of the covered
class of employees, has not satisfied applicable minimum age and
service requirements imposed by the plan.39
The term “participation,” however, has a different meaning depending on whether it is used in reference to a defined benefit or a
defined contribution plan.40 In defined benefit plans, where retirement benefits are paid as a set amount, workers are considered participants whenever they annually accrue portions of their retirement

32. See id.
33. See Craig Copeland, Emp. Benefit Research Inst., Retirement Plan Participation and
Retirees’ Perception of Their Standard of Living, 289 I SSUE B RIEF 5 (2006), available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_01-20061.pdf (noting that some workers are
not eligible to participate and others are unable to afford the employee contributions).
34. Id. at 40 n.11.
35. Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension System?, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 305, 322–23 (2007).
36. See Daniel L. Halperin, Retirement Security and Tax Equity: An Evaluation of ERISA, 17
B.C. INDUST. & COM. L. REV. 739, 742 (1976) (noting that some employers exclude workers in
certain divisions or make distinctions based on whether the employee is hourly and salaried).
Workers classified as independent contractors are also exempted from ERISA’s nondiscrimination calculations. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (applying common law agency principles to classify workers as employees or independent contractors under ERISA).
37. Turner et al., supra note 29, at 36–37.
38. Id. at 36.
39. See I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(A) (2012) (allowing employers to exclude workers under the age
of twenty-one or those with less than one year of service from the retirement plan).
40. See Turner et al., supra note 29, at 36.
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benefits under the plan.41 In contrast, in defined contribution plans,
where the balances of the individual retirement accounts determine
the benefits, workers generally are considered participants if they
receive allocations of contributions or forfeitures to their accounts in
a given year.42 In 401(k) plans, where employees voluntarily choose
to participate, workers are considered participants if they are eligible to make elective contributions, whether or not they choose to do
so.43 Consequently, an individual could be considered as actively
participating in a 401(k) plan in a given year even if there were no
contributions or forfeitures credited to his or her account during
that year.
The determination of whether an individual is participating in defined contribution plans can be further complicated by whether a
participant has an outstanding loan balance or not.44 When workers
borrow from their plans, some defined contribution plans will not
permit them to make contributions to the plan until the loan balance
is paid off.45 As a result, in some cases individuals could be considered to be participating when they not only have no new accruals
but also are not allowed to make new contributions to their retirement plans.46
The fact that the term “participation” is not consistently defined
among those who compile data to be used for empirical studies relating to participation rates in defined contribution plans suggests
that the results may be misleading with respect to the rates of workers actually receiving benefits from such plans. For example, in the
Form 5500, which is used to report detailed statistical information
about a plan to the Department of Labor, “active participation” for
defined contribution plans is determined by whether a current
worker has a positive account balance with the employer.47 This definition allows workers who are not contributing to their retirement
plans to be counted as “actively participating.”48 Accordingly, a
41. See Barbara A. Butrica et al., The Disappearing Defined Benefit Pension and Its Potential Impact on the Retirement Incomes of Baby Boomers, 69 SOC. SEC. BULL., no. 3, 2009 at 2, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v69n3/v69n3p1.pdf.
42. See Turner et al., supra note 29, at 36.
43. Id. at 36–37.
44. See Thomas Olson, 401(k) Leakage: Crafting a Solution Consistent with the Shift to
Employee-Managed Retirement Accounts, 20 ELDER L.J. 449, 463 (2013).
45. See id.
46. See id.; see also Turner et al., supra note 29, at 36–37.
47. See Turner et al., supra note 29, at 37.
48. See Geoffrey Sanzenbacher, Estimating Pension Coverage Using Different Data Sets, 51
CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RES. B.C. ISSUE BRIEF 1, 1 (2006), available at http://crr.bc.edu/
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worker who was once allocated a forfeiture, or who elected to make
a single contribution in a prior plan year, would be considered to be
actively participating for all subsequent years of service prior to
separation or retirement. Such an expansive interpretation of the
term appears to overstate participant rates and also is at odds with
the underlying policy and purpose of the nondiscrimination rules.49
Accurately calculating the percentage of workers covered by and
participating in employer-provided private retirement plans is an
important task. This information is necessary to quantify the coverage problem and to measure the outcomes of policymaking efforts
to broaden benefit distribution. Currently, because workers are
counted as participating in defined contribution plans when contributions are being made neither by the employer nor the worker, the
participation and coverage are unreliable measurements of the
number of workers who are actively saving for retirement.50
This result is problematic because it both obscures the issue and
understates the coverage problem. One of the primary objectives of
ERISA was to expand private retirement plans in order to increase
the number of participants receiving retirement benefits. Therefore,
the emphasis of initiatives to increase coverage in the private retirement system should be on actual retirement savings as measured
by the vested account balances rather than on amounts made available by the employer for retirement savings, or on the aggregate
number of plans that are offered in the private retirement system.51
Furthermore, as 401(k) plans are increasingly used as primary retirement savings vehicles, the accurate measurement of meaningful
participation in these plans will become more important in evaluating the effectiveness of the private retirement system, particularly as
it relates to low- and middle-income workers.52

B. The Nondiscrimination Rules
The nondiscrimination rules are exceedingly technical and complex.53 For the most part, the complexity is due to a mix of competbriefs/estimating-pension-coverage-using-different-data-sets/(noting that Form 5500 often
overestimates the number of active participants in retirement plans).
49. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
50. See Sanzenbacher, supra note 48.
51. See discussion infra Section I.C.
52. See Turner et al., supra note 29, at 42.
53. See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS 437 (2d ed. 2008).
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ing interests that creates tension in the structure of the rules. This
tension exists because the private retirement system is voluntary,
making it necessary to give tax benefits to highly compensated employees in qualified retirement plans so that non-highly compensated employees can also benefit from such plans.54 Thus, on the one
hand, the rules are designed to encourage broad participation and
prevent excessive disparity in participation between non-highly and
highly compensated employees. On the other hand, they are designed to permit some level of disparity in favor of highly compensated employees, who presumably could save on their own without
tax incentives, so as not to discourage employers from establishing
qualified retirement plans.55
To ensure that qualified plans cover a significant percentage of
the non-highly compensated workforce, the Internal Revenue Code
has numerous nondiscrimination rules.56 One set of rules considers
all of the employees of the employer to determine whether a sufficient percentage of non-highly compensated employees are participating relative to the rate of participation of highly compensated
employees.57 Another set of nondiscrimination rules considers percentages of participation based on the actual level of contributions
or benefits provided by the plan to participants in order to determine whether the plan discriminates in favor of highly compensated
employees.58 In addition to these rules that apply to all types of
qualified plans, there are special nondiscrimination rules that apply

54. See id. at 436–37.
55. See S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 18–19 (1973) (warning that increasing coverage too expansively could lead employers to reduce benefits or stop offering new plans).
56. See G.A. Mackenzie & Jonathan B. Forman, Reforming the Second Tier of the U.S. Pension
System: Tabula Rasa or Step by Step?, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 631, 646 (2013). In addition to
those described in this section of the article, there are the rules found in I.R.C. § 401(a)(26) that
apply only to defined benefit plans. These rules provide:
an objective test to determine whether the defined benefit plan actually covers
enough employees. It is intended to address two concerns. First, it is designed to limit the extent to which employers may create different benefit formulas for different
groups of employees and thus maximize the benefits in favor of highly compensated
employees. Second, it limits the extent to which a defined benefit plan can operate as
an individual account for a single employee or a small group of employees.
FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 53, at 436. Also, I.R.C. § 401(a) “permits certain plans to have a
higher level of discrimination in contributions or benefits than would be permitted under
I.R.C. § 401(a)(4)” when Social Security benefits are taken into account for purposes of the
nondiscrimination tests. Id. at 437.
57. See I.R.C. § 410(b) (2012).
58. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(4).
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to 401(k) plans.59 These rules recognize that contributions to 401(k)
plans depend on an employee’s choice to defer compensation, and
accordingly require that the deferral rates by highly compensated
employees are proportional to those of non-highly compensated
employees.60
Employers, of course, can completely avoid the complexity of all
of the nondiscrimination rules by providing uniform benefits to all
employees covered by a plan.61 Many employers, however, do not
choose the broadest coverage solution because they desire to reduce
the costs of their plans.62

C. Weaknesses of the Rules
A significant weakness of the nondiscrimination rules is that they
fail to distinguish between vested and non-vested accrued benefits.63
Vesting is a concept that determines the rights of plan participants
to receive the accrued benefits attributable to employer contributions in the event that employment is terminated prior to retirement.64 The rationale for permitting forfeitures is that it gives employers a method of promoting worker retention by rewarding longterm service.65
The minimum vesting standards require that benefits become
non-forfeitable after a prescribed period of years of service with an
employer.66 The applicable vesting periods depend on the type of
plan offered by the employer and the type of contribution.67 Benefits
derived from an employee’s own contributions must be fully vested
immediately, regardless of plan type.68 Benefits attributable to em59. See I.R.C. § 401(k)(3). See also I.R.C. § 401(k)(12) (outlining a “safe harbor” to ease the
administrative burden on 401(k) plans that make a minimum employer contribution or meet
specified matching requirements).
60. See § 401(k)(3). There are, however, safe harbor rules for 401(k) plans that permit greater disparity between the levels of contributions made to and by highly and non-highly compensated employees.
61. See FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 53, at 437. See also I.R.C. § 410(b).
62. See Kathryn L. Moore, An Overview of the U.S. Retirement Income Security System and the
Principles and Values It Reflects, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5, 46 (2011).
63. See Sanzenbacher, supra note 48, at 1.
64. See Halperin, supra note 36, at 743.
65. See Daniel I. Halperin, Special Tax Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement Programs: Is It
‘Still’ Viable as a Means of Increasing Retirement Income? Should It Continue?, 49 TAX L. REV. 1,
8–9 (1993) (describing how workers who frequently change jobs will lose unvested benefits).
66. See I.R.C. § 411(a)(2).
67. See § 411(a)(2)(A)–(B).
68. § 411(a)(1).
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ployer contributions made to defined contribution plans must either
vest fully after three years of service, or vest incrementally with a
minimum percentage of 20% after two years of service and 100% after six years.69 Benefits attributable to employer contributions made
to defined benefit plans must either vest fully after five years of service, or vest incrementally with a minimum of 20% after three years
of service and 100% after seven.70
Vesting rates correlate strongly with earnings levels.71 As a general rule, the lower the compensation, the higher the turnover.72 This
relationship occurs because higher-paid employees tend to have
more stable and lasting employment relationships with their employers than do lower-paid employees.73 According to a 2003 Employee Benefit Research Institute study, only 12% of workers with
an annual income below $5000 were vested, as compared with 47%
in the $20,000–$24,999 bracket, and 73% in the $50,000-and-over
bracket.74 As a result, it can be predicted that lower-paid employees
are more likely to forfeit portions of their accrued benefits than are
higher-paid employees.
Therefore, considering the goals of pension policy generally and
the purpose of the nondiscrimination rules specifically, the use of
vested accrued benefits, rather than accrued benefits alone, would
appear to be a better indicator of the level of benefits received by
plan participants from private retirement plans. Furthermore, because non-highly compensated employees are more likely to leave
before becoming fully vested than highly compensated employees,
the failure to use vested accrued benefits may disproportionately
overstate the level of benefits actually received by non-highly compensated workers. This result, coupled with the expansive definition
of “participation” used in the measurement of participation rates,
suggests that private retirement plans may provide even fewer re-

69. See § 411(a)(2)(B).
70. See § 411(a)(2)(A).
71. See EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, Table 10.9 (last updated
May 2011), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/databook/DB.Chapter%2010.pdf
[hereinafter EBRI DATABOOK].
72. See, e.g., Rachel Harvey, Note, Labor Law: Challenges to the Living Wage Movement: Obstacles in a Path to Economic Justice, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 229, 248 (2003) (“When employees
receive higher wages they do a better job, as reflected in their improved morale, lower rate of
absenteeism, lower turnover, and improvement in the quality of applicants.”).
73. See id.
74. See EBRI DATABOOK, supra note 71.
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tirement benefits to low- and middle-income workers than the data
indicates.75

II. WHO IS COVERED AND WHO IS NOT
Regardless of how broadly or narrowly the term is defined, participation, like vesting, correlates very strongly with income.76 By
any measurement, those who lack pension coverage tend to be lowincome employees and those who have it tend to be high-income.77
Other factors that correlate with participation and coverage rates are
worker demographics and employer characteristics.78

A. Participation Rates and Income
As of 2006, only 13% of individuals earning less than $5000 annually participated in a private retirement plan, as compared with 51%
in the $20,000–$24,999 bracket, and 78% in the $50,000-and-over
bracket.79 This result occurs partly because of the progressive tax
rate structure of the federal income tax system, which makes exclusions, deductions, and tax deferral more valuable to taxpayers with
higher marginal tax rates.80 Consequently, high-income workers
gain substantial economic benefits from the ability to accrue tax-free
income in qualified retirement savings plans, whereas low-income
workers do not.81
The disparity in participation rates relative to income is of special
concern in considering the effectiveness of 401(k) plans in light of
75. See Sanzenbacher, supra note 48, at 1.
76. See Craig Copeland, Emp. Benefit Research Inst., Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic Differences and Trends, 392 ISSUE BRIEF 9-10 (2013), available at http://www
.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_011-13.No392.Particip.pdf (noting that participation rate
varies according to the employer’s size, industry, hours worked by the employee, age of the
employee, and gender of the employee).
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 52 (Comm. Print 2008) (“[T]ax expenditures formulated as deductions
will generally reduce the progressivity of the tax system, by reducing average tax rates more
for higher marginal rate taxpayers than for lower marginal rate taxpayers.”).
81. Id.; see also Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 294. But see Eric Toder & Karen E.
Smith, Do Low-Income Workers Benefit from 401(k) Plans?, 11-15 CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RES.
B.C. ISSUE BRIEF 1, 1 (2011), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/IB_11
-15_508.pdf (noting that although low-income employees receive less of a direct benefit from
the tax subsidy, the nondiscrimination rules provide an indirect benefit in the form of higher
total compensation when employers make contributions to retirement plans).
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their increasing popularity.82 These plans, which represent the fastest growing type of defined contribution plan, dominate new plan
offerings in the private sector.83 As of 2009, approximately 67% of all
employers maintaining retirement plans offered 401(k) plans as
their primary retirement savings vehicles, as compared to 35% ten
years earlier.84
The distinctive characteristic of 401(k) plans is that employees
voluntarily elect to make pre-tax contributions to the plan as deferred compensation rather than receive those amounts as compensation in the year in which they were earned.85 Notwithstanding the
preferential tax treatment given to contributions made to qualified
plans, low- and middle-income employees covered by elective contribution plans often choose not to contribute.86 In fact, of all of the
factors used to predict 401(k) plan participation, income level is the
most important determinant of whether a worker will contribute or
not.87 Thus, to encourage greater participation among low- and
middle-income workers, many employers offering 401(k) plans will
match the employees’ elected contribution at some level.88 For example, the employer may match 100% of the first 1% of pay contributed by the employee, and 50% thereafter, up to a specified limit.
Even with the prevalence of such incentives, however, less than 50%
of all workers who earn $30,000 or less per year contribute to their
401(k) plans, as compared to 87% of workers who earn $100,000 or
more.89

82. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 55.
83. See U.S. D EP ’ T OF L ABOR E MP . B ENEFITS S EC . A DMIN ., P RIVATE P ENSION P LAN
B ULLETIN H ISTORICAL T ABLES 19 (2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/
privatepensionplanbulletinhistoricaltables.pdf (showing that the number of 401(k) plans increased from 17,303 in 1984 to 436,207 by 2005).
84. See Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 301 & n. 79.
85. See I.R.C. § 401(k)(2)(A) (2012). Employers are also permitted to match a certain
amount of employee contributions, provided they comply with nondiscrimination rules. See
I.R.C. § 401(m).
86. See William F. Bassett et al., How Workers Use 401(k) Plans: The Participation, Contribution, and Withdrawal Decisions, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 263, 270 (1998).
87. See id.
88. See Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 302–03. However, for 2014, the total
amount contributed to an employee’s plan may not exceed the lesser of either the employee’s
salary or $52,000. See Retirement Topics–401(k) and Profit Sharing Plan Contribution Limits, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/Retirement-Topics---401(k)
-and-Profit-Sharing-Plan-Contribution-Limits (last updated Apr. 2, 2014).
89. See VANGUARD, HOW AMERICA SAVES 2013: A REPORT ON VANGUARD 2012 DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PLAN DATA 23 (2013), https://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/HAS13.pdf.
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Not surprisingly, contribution rates also vary with income.90
When low- and middle-income workers do contribute, their contributions represent a smaller percentage of income contributions of
higher-income workers.91 In 1992, taxpayers with income below
$30,000 made contributions of only 4% of their income, while taxpayers with income over $75,000 made contributions of 8%.92 In
2008, 54% of participating employees earning between $20,000 and
$40,000 had savings rates so low that they annually saved less than
$5000 in their 401(k) retirement plans.93 Such small amounts are
grossly inadequate to provide retirement security for these workers.94 Therefore, low- and middle-income workers using 401(k) plans
as their primary retirement savings instruments are far less likely to
accumulate adequate savings for retirement.
There are numerous explanations for low participation rates
among low- and middle-income workers. One reason, referenced
above, is that low- and middle-income workers have lower marginal
tax rates and, therefore, benefit less from the preferential tax treatment of contributions to qualified retirement plans.95 Another reason is that low- and middle-income workers have more immediate
and pressing needs for their funds than saving for retirement.96 Also, some low-income workers may be covered by means-tested welfare programs that discourage participation by effectively imposing
high implicit tax rates on all savings.97 Additionally, low participation rates may be the result of low-income workers undervaluing
the benefits of retirement savings, or having reduced incentives to
save for retirement because Social Security income-replacement
rates are higher for low-income workers.98

90. Id.
91. Id. at 28.
92. Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 303.
93. See HEWITT, 2009 HEWITT BENCHMARKS - HOW WELL ARE EMPLOYEES SAVING AND INVESTING
IN 401(K) PLANS 17 (2009), http://www.aon.com/attachments/thought-leadership/Hewitt
_2009_Universe_Benchmarks.pdf.
94. See Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 303.
95. See Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329, 341 (2009)
(noting that tax deductions are less valuable for low-income workers).
96. See Bassett et al., supra note 86, at 270.
97. Id.
98. See AON CONSULTING, 2008 REPLACEMENT RATIO STUDY: A MEASUREMENT TOOL FOR RETIREMENT PLANNING 2 (2008), http://www.aon.com/about-aon/intellectual-capital/attachments/
human-capital-consulting/RRStudy070308.pdf (finding that Social Security payments will replace about 60% of the pre-retirement income for a worker making less than $30,000 per year).
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When low-income workers do choose to contribute to 401(k)
plans, the occurrences of “cash outs” are more likely to erode their
retirement savings. Plans typically allow participants to liquidate
their account balances when they separate from service prior to
reaching retirement age. Some plans automatically liquidate relatively small account balances upon separation of service prior to retirement.99 Cash outs occur when workers fail to roll over these distributions into other qualified retirement accounts. Although workers can avoid paying taxes and substantial penalties when they roll
over the funds into either an IRA or another qualified plan, a significant number of workers choose not to do so.
In 2010, approximately 42% of terminated employees chose to
cash out their funds rather than roll them over.100 Within this population, lower-income workers were more likely than higher-income
workers to liquidate their retirement savings in this manner.101 Over
one-third of employees earning less than $30,000 cashed out their
account balances, as compared to only 10% of those who earned
over $100,000.102 Obviously, when distributions from retirement savings plans are not reinvested in other retirement savings instruments, it is far more likely that the funds will be used for nonretirement purposes.103

B. Other Worker Demographics Correlating to Participation Levels
Factors other than income correlate with lower participation and
coverage rates among low- and middle-income workers, including
gender, age, and employer characteristics.104 In the aggregate, women
have slightly lower levels of participation than do men.105 As of
2012, 45% of all male workers between the ages of twenty-one and
sixty-four participated in a private plan as compared to 44% of
women in the same category.106 This result is attributable to numerous factors: women earn lower wages; work fewer hours; have more
99. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(v) (2012) (workers can avoid a 10% tax on early distributions from the plan if they are separated from employment after age 55); I.R.C. § 401(a)(31)(B)
(permitting mandatory distribution when balances are under $5,000 total).
100. See Olson, supra note 44, at 459.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Regina T. Jefferson, Striking a Balance in the Cash Balance Plan Debate, 49 BUFF. L. REV.
513, 534 (2001).
104. See Copeland, supra note 76, at 10.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 11.
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episodic work patterns; and have greater concentration in industries
in which retirement plan coverage is low.107 All of these factors correlate with lower participation rates, regardless of gender.108
Interestingly, however, when measuring participation rates
among workers in individual employment status categories that
have lower participation rates, such as part-time or seasonal workers, women have higher participation rates than men.109 For example, 22% of part-time, permanent female workers participate in
plans, as compared to only 14% of men.110
Age is another factor that influences plan participation rates.
Across all income levels, younger workers are less likely than older
workers to participate in a retirement plan.111 This disparity most
likely reflects the fact that individuals are less willing to save for
events that will occur decades in the future. Also, because ERISA
exempts workers under the age of twenty-one from the nondiscrimination tests, employers are not penalized for excluding very young
workers from their plans.112 The combination of these factors reduces the effectiveness of the tax incentives in maximizing participation
among younger workers in private retirement plans.
The size of a worker’s employer is another significant factor in
predicting plan participation. Smaller companies are far less likely
to sponsor retirement plans for their workers than are larger ones.
Approximately 20% of individuals working for employers with fewer
than twenty-five employees participate in employer-sponsored retirement plans, whereas participation rates among employers with
1000 or more employees exceed 60%.113
Additionally, the type of industry in which the employee works
correlates with plan participation. For instance, employees in the
manufacturing, transportation, and financial industries are more
likely to participate in employer-sponsored plans than employees in
the service industry.114 Public sector workers are also more likely to
participate in employer-sponsored plans than private sector work107. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 28.
108. Id.
109. See Copeland, supra note 76, at 10.
110. Id. at 13, fig. 3.
111. Id. at 14.
112. See I.R.C. § 410(a)(1) (2012).
113. See William E. Even & David A. Macpherson, Improving Pension Coverage at Small
Firms, in OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP 123 (Diana Furchtgott-Roth ed., 2008)
(reporting 2004 participation rates); see also Copeland, supra note 76, at 10 (reporting similar
findings for 2012 rates).
114. See Copeland, supra note 76, at 10.
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ers.115 This correlation occurs presumably because employers in certain sectors of the economy are more likely to offer plans than employers in others.

III. PROPOSALS TO INCREASE COVERAGE
Although 401(k) plans dominate new private plan offerings, their
popularity has not increased overall coverage in the private retirement system. Coverage rates have hovered around 50% since the
passage of ERISA, notwithstanding the shift from defined benefit to
defined contribution plans.116 Therefore, there continues to be a need
to explore ways of increasing coverage and participation rates, particularly among low- and middle-income workers, who in the absence of such incentives may be unable to save on their own. However, the methods used must be structured differently in the current
pension landscape.
Section 401(k) plans present difficult tradeoffs for plan participants. Participants are given greater autonomy and flexibility on the
one hand, but on the other they are exposed to greater burdens and
risks. At every stage of their retirement savings process, workers are
required to make critical decisions regarding their retirement savings. These decisions can include whether to contribute, what level
of contribution to make, and which investment strategy to use, as
well as what to do with distributions received prior to retirement.117
Regardless of the burdens and risks that these plans present to
employees, they are more popular than traditional defined benefit
plans because they are often less expensive, simpler, and less risky
for employers to maintain.118 Thus, in spite of their shortcomings,
the trend of using 401(k) plans as primary retirement savings instruments is well established and is unlikely to change in the near
future. Without an option to offer a 401(k) plan, some employers
may choose not to establish plans and, as a result, some employees
may save even less for retirement.119 For these reasons, it would be
difficult, even counterproductive, to eliminate 401(k) plans as retirement savings options because of their tremendous appeal to employees and employers alike.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id.
See Even & Macpherson, supra note 113, at 2.
See Bassett et al., supra note 86, at 269.
See Jefferson, Rethinking, supra note 8, at 636.
Id.
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Even so, the current benefit distribution in 401(k) plans does not
effectively advance one of ERISA’s primary objectives—to broaden
participation in private retirement plans.120 Furthermore, the current
structure of the savings incentives in the private retirement system
disproportionately benefits higher-income workers. Thus, to justify
the tax subsidy given to qualified plans, affirmative measures must
be taken to increase savings rates and broaden benefit distribution
from 401(k) plans to include more low- and middle-income workers.
In response to these concerns, the remainder of this Reflection
proposes the following: (1) mandatory education programs for all
401(k) plans; (2) mandatory automatic enrollment and escalation
features in 401(k) plans; and (3) an additional tax incentive to encourage greater participation of low- and middle-income employees,
as measured by their vested accrued benefits.

A. Mandatory Employer-Provided Education in 401(k) Plans
1. The benefits of financial education programs
Notwithstanding the importance and complexity of the retirement
planning decisions that employers sponsoring 401(k) plans require
employees to make, there is currently no requirement that employers provide financial education or training. This situation is problematic because most individuals are not equipped to manage their
own retirement security, lacking both financial training and prior
experience with complex financial and investment matters.121 Without such training or experience, the majority of individuals eligible
to participate in 401(k) plans make less-than-optimum decisions
throughout the retirement savings process.122
Research shows that financial illiteracy in the United States is
widespread across the spectrum of workers.123 A survey conducted
by the University of Michigan gave 1000 people between the ages of
120. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
121. See Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress’ Misguided Decision to Leave
401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 361, 392 (2002) (noting that “participant decisions in 401(k) plans are often the product of deficient information,
inadequate knowledge, and cognitive biases”).
122. WAGNER LAW GRP., NAVIGATING THE NEW REALITIES OF 401(K) PARTICIPANT EDUCATION 2 (2001),
http://www.wagnerlawgroup.com/documents/WPNavigatingtheNewRealitiesof401kParticipantEducation
.pdf (advising that 401(k) “[p]lan sponsors also have a strong incentive to educate participants
on investment concepts and provide allocation decision support, which can reduce the incidence and severity of poor decision-making by participants”).
123. See Olson, supra note 44, at 470–71 (noting that many Americans have limited
knowledge of financial markets and prudent investing strategies).
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eighteen and ninety-seven a financial literacy test.124 The study
found that, on average, respondents could only answer 67% of the
questions asked.125 These findings are disturbing because financial
literacy is one of the best predictors of an individual’s ability to effectively make prudent financial decisions, including those necessary
for effective retirement planning.126
Similar results were reported from studies with smaller samples
that target more specific aspects of financial literacy.127 For example,
a study conducted in 1988 examined the level of knowledge workers
had regarding their retirement plans.128 That study found that a significant percentage of the subjects were unable to identify key features of their plans, including the plan’s normal and early retirement ages and how much their retirement benefits would increase if
they postponed retirement.129 Other research has also determined
that employees regularly misunderstand some of the key features of
their plans.130 A 2007 study specifically targeting 401(k) plans found
that nearly 50% of non-participating employees in 401(k) plans had
low financial literacy and, of the employees who participated, more
than 20% had low financial literacy.131
Equally alarming, however, is the fact that a majority of employees not only fail to understand the features of their plans, but also
substantially misestimate their expected benefits from both Social
Security and their private retirement plans.132 This result is especially
disturbing because Social Security and private retirement plans represent two of the three primary sources of retirement income, the
third source being personal savings.133 Thus, having accurate infor124. See Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy: Evidence and Implications for Financial Education, May 2009, at 1, 2, available at https://www.tiaa-crefinstitute.org/
public/pdf/institute/research/trends_issues/ti_financialliteracy0509a.pdf.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 5–6.
127. See id. at 2.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Olson, supra note 44, at 472.
131. See id. (citing Julie R. Agnew et al., Do Financial Literacy and Mistrust Affect 401(k) Participation? CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH ISSUE IN BRIEF, Nov. 2007, No. 7-17, at 1, 1–2, available at
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2007/11/IB_7-17.pdf).
132. Id.; cf. Colleen E. Medill, Transforming the Role of the Social Security Administration, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 323, 354 (2007) (proposing that the Social Security Administration should
serve as the central authority providing education and advice on retirement savings and
investment).
133. See Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged
Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV. 938, 939 (2007) (noting
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mation about the expected benefits from these two sources is critically important in financial preparation for retirement.
Financial education programs are helpful in improving this situation by enabling workers to make better decisions and appreciate
the risk of shortage if they fail to do so. A 2009 study conducted by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago found a positive correlation between employer-provided education programs and greater employee 401(k) contributions.134 The study further concluded that educating employees on the importance of planning for retirement raised
overall retirement savings rates.135 Other studies supporting these
findings show that individuals who attend financial education programs generally save more than individuals who do not.136

2. A financial education requirement
To ensure that 401(k) plan participants have access to financial
education, an education requirement should be imposed on all employers sponsoring such plans. In the absence of a mandate, many
plan participants will be forced to make important financial decisions regarding their retirements without the benefit of financial education.137 Furthermore, requiring employers to assume some responsibility for educating plan participants also helps to justify the tax
that these three sources of retirement income are commonly referred to as the “three-legged
stool”). The personal savings rate in America has fallen dramatically since the 1980s. Id. at 960.
134. See Olson, supra note 44, at 474–75 (citing GENE AMROMIN ET AL., FINANCIAL LITERACY
AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND COUNSELING: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 12–15 (2010), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/region/
foreclosure_resource_center/more_financial_literacy.pdf (last visited May 29, 2014)).
135. Id.; see also William J. Arnone, Ernst & Young LLP, Educating Pension Plan Participants, Address at the 2004 Pension Research Council Symposium at the Wharton School in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Apr. 26–27, 2004), available at http://pfeef.com/speeches/Educating
-Pension-Plan-Participants.pdf.
136. See, e.g., Robert L. Clark et al., Financial Education and Retirement Savings, Presentation at the Conference: Sustainable Community Development: What Works, What Doesn’t,
and Why (Mar. 27–28, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/communityaffairs/
national/CA_Conf_SusCommDev/pdf/clarkrobert.pdf (noting the general consensus that financial education programs increase employee savings rates).
137. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) encouraged employers to offer education
plans by amending ERISA to include an exemption from fiduciary liability for plans that provide investment advice to participants under eligible investment advice arrangements. See
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780; Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1108(g) (2012); I.R.C. § 4975 (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408(g)-1
(2013). Prior to the PPA, the fiduciary rules of ERISA deterred employers from providing financial education programs because of the possibility that the programs could be considered
investment advice, which under certain circumstances would be prohibited. See Jefferson, Balancing, supra note 13, at 206.
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subsidy that employers receive in connection with their sponsored
401(k) plans.138
The success of an education program is determined both by its
availability and its quality of instruction. Therefore, the proposed
education requirement regulates the timing, the type, and the content of the information to be provided in the following manner:
First, education programs satisfying the proposed mandate would
be required to utilize a variety of educational media, including a
complement of written materials, seminars, and financial planning
software. This approach responds to evidence showing that printed
information is less effective than other modes of communication in
aiding the investment education of plan participants.139
Second, the proposed education program would require that financial education be made available on a regular basis to plan participants throughout their employment, regardless of age.140 Researchers have found that higher frequency of financial education
programs is correlated with higher contribution levels among lowincome workers.141 Many employers presently offer one-time planning sessions to older employees, believing that only those approaching retirement need financial education. However, imprudent investment decisions can be just as devastating—if not more
so—for younger employees. This is because younger employees
have longer investment horizons; consequently, the negative impact
of their mistakes are compounded over greater periods of time. In
order to ensure that both older workers and younger workers have
access to financial training, under the proposed education program,
employers sponsoring 401(k) plans would be required to provide
investment information periodically to all workers eligible to participate in the plan.142
The proposed financial education programs would also include
instruction on the importance of not only contributions and investment allocation, but also the timing and forms of distribution. This
information is essential in financial training because decisions re138. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
139. See Jefferson, Balancing, supra note 13, at 207 & n.103; see also WAGNER LAW GRP., supra
note 122, at 11 (“Many participants will not respond to passive education or written materials
. . . . Accordingly, plan sponsors should consider providing active education through a provider
that engages participants and provides meaningful decision-making assistance to participants.”).
140. See Olson, supra note 44, at 475, 480 (arguing for recurring, regular financial education
plans).
141. See id. at 475.
142. See Jefferson, Balancing, supra note 13, at 207.
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garding these matters have long-term effects on retirement security.
For this reason, under the current law there are rules that encourage
some forms of distribution over others, while other rules restrict early access to retirement plan assets.143 These rules advance pension
policy because the goal of the private retirement system is to assist
workers in both saving for retirement and managing their assets to
last throughout retirement.

B. Mandating Automatic Enrollment and Escalation
1. The concepts of automatic enrollment and escalation
Initially, 401(k) plans were offered primarily as tax-preferred,
supplemental accounts for employees who wished to save additional amounts for retirement.144 Generally, employers who sponsored
these plans also offered traditional defined benefit plans that provided non-elective predetermined retirement benefits.145 Therefore,
because it was not anticipated that workers would rely on the 401(k)
funds for their retirement security, it was appropriate to require
employees to both take affirmative steps to enroll in the plan, and to
assume all of the risks associated with it.146 However, as 401(k) plans
are increasingly used as primary retirement savings instruments, a
design that makes non-enrollment the default setting no longer
seems appropriate.147
Research shows that newly hired employees are very slow to elect
to participate in 401(k) plans. After as many as three years of employment, nearly 33% of workers eligible to enroll have not elected
to do so.148 Although it may appear that the choice to enroll is a simple one, there are a variety of savings and investment decisions involved in the process that can easily explain the delay.149 To enroll,
workers often must decide not only whether to contribute, but also

143. See id. at 208 n.105; see also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 511–35 (explaining that
both ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code restrict the timing and character of distributions
from qualified plans).
144. See SHLOMO BENARTZI, SAVE MORE TOMORROW: PRACTICAL BEHAVIORAL FINANCE SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE 401(K) PLANS 3–4 (2012); see also Kara M. Klaas, Left in the Dark: SarbanesOxley and Corporate Abuse of 401(k) Plan Blackout Periods, 29 J. CORP. L. 801, 804 (2004).
145. See FLA. PUB. PENSION TRS. ASS’N, 401(K) PLANS ARE NOT RETIREMENT PLANS 6 (Mar.
10, 2010), available at http://www.fppta.org/FPPTA/MR_Articles.aspx.
146. See BENARTZI, supra note 144, at 4–5.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 5.
149. See id.
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how much to contribute, how to select investments from a wide array of options, and when and whether to increase contributions.
Thus, the decision to enroll requires consideration of numerous
complex concepts that many workers may not feel comfortable or
equipped to make.150 This discomfort causes some individuals to fall
into the pattern of putting off the decision until they have an opportunity to acquire more information, which oftentimes never occurs.151 As a result, these individuals miss out on valuable economic
benefits, including the tax advantages of saving in a qualified retirement plan, the value of compound growth, and, in some cases,
employer matched funds.152
Thankfully, these challenges are not insurmountable and can be
addressed by providing financial education, as discussed above.
They also can be significantly minimized by reversing the default
setting of the plan from non-enrollment to enrollment.153 Under such
a design, immediately after workers become eligible to participate in
401(k) plans, they are deemed to have elected to defer a predetermined percentage of their compensation to the plan, with predetermined asset allocations.154 Workers who are automatically enrolled
in this manner are free to “opt out”; however, behavioral finance research indicates that most individuals will not because they are not
active decision makers.155 The principle of “inertia” explains that
most individuals will remain with a default option because they will
fail to take affirmative measures to change.156 Accordingly, when the
plan has a default setting of saving, workers will not act to change
the setting and will save; when the plan has a default setting of not
saving, workers will not act to change the setting and will not save.157
The auto-enrollment concept has been studied over the last two
decades and has proven to be very effective in increasing participa150. See supra subsection III.A.1.
151. See Tax Reform and Tax-Favored Retirement Accounts: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Ways and Means, 112th Cong. 92 (2012) (statement of David C. John, Senior Research Fellow in
Retirement Security and Financial Institutions, The Heritage Foundation).
152. See BENARTZI, supra note 144, at 45–46 (describing the compound effect of retirement
decisions made early in a worker’s career).
153. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 430 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-1(a)(3)(ii) (as
amended in 2009)); see also BENARTZI, supra note 144, at 38–56.
154. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 430.
155. Id. (citing Richard Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral
Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. 164, 164–87 (2004)).
156. See id. at 10, 38–40 (advising that workers who initially chose to opt out of a plan
should still be continuously asked when they would like to be enrolled in the future).
157. See id. at 430.
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tion rates among eligible employees.158 Some studies have shown increases of up to 20%, from mid-60% levels to mid-80% levels, as a
result of this approach.159 Automatic enrollment has been especially
effective in increasing participation rates among populations that
otherwise tend to have lower savings rates, such as low- and middleincome workers, women, and younger workers.160 Some studies
have shown a rate increase of more than 65%, from the mid-teens
levels to the mid-80% levels for these groups.161
Although automatic enrollment can significantly increase participation rates in 401(k) plans, it does not necessarily increase the
overall savings rates in these plans.162 In fact, some have argued that
the opt-out design actually lowers overall savings rates because it
encourages participants to remain at very conservative default positions for both contribution levels and investment allocations.163 In
other words, these skeptics explain that those who would have
elected to save at higher rates in the absence of the opt-out design
may actually save less by remaining at the lower rates.164 To the extent that this decrease is not offset by an increase in savings among
those who would not have elected to save in the absence of the opt158. See Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, The Impact of PPA on Retirement Savings for 401(k)
Participants, 318 EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. 1 (2008), available at http://www.ebri.org/
pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_06-20087.pdf.
159. See Tax Reform and Tax-Favored Retirement Accounts: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways
and Means, 112th Cong. 86 (2012) (statement of David C. John, Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation).
160. See id.
161. See id.; see also Press Release, Fidelity Invs., Fidelity Analysis Highlights Positive Impact of Pension Protection Act on 401(k) Plans and Their Participants (Nov. 30, 2011), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/30/idUS155072+30-Nov-2011+BW20111130 (finding
that auto enrollment increased the participation rate of workers age twenty to twenty-four from
only 20% up to about 76%).
162. See Barbara A. Butrica & Nadia S. Karamcheva, How Does 401(k) Auto-Enrollment Relate
to the Employer Match and Total Compensation?, 13-14 CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT B.C. 5
(2013), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/IB_13-14.pdf; see also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 430.
163. See Butrica & Karamcheva, supra note 162, at 5 (“While auto-enrollment will increase
saving for workers who would not have participated without it, those who would have participated on their own may end up saving less due to relatively low employer match rates and
low default contribution rates.”); see also Larry W. Beeferman & Matthew B. Becker, Going on
Automatic: The Right Path Toward Retirement Income Security for All? 6 HARV. PENSION & CAPITAL STEWARDSHIP PROJECT OCCASIONAL PAPERS 52 (2010), available at http://www.law.harvard
.edu/programs/lwp/pensions/publications/occpapers/occasionalpaper6.pdf (“[T]hat very
inertia which is said to make automatic enrollment effective also operates against increases in
contributions: because workers are said to be passive, they not only do not act to opt out after
being automatically enrolled, but also do not act to change their contribution rate.”).
164. See Beeferman & Becker, supra note 163, at 52.
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out design, the net result is a wash, or potentially even a decrease in
overall savings.165
An automatic escalation feature that provides for gradual increases in employee contributions over time can mitigate this effect. Although participants are free to opt out of such arrangements, they
tend not to because of the same effect of inertia that prevents them
from opting out of enrollment.166 Thus, if the default setting is to increase savings rates over time, they will; if the default setting is to remain at the same level, they will. Accordingly, the use of automatic
escalation in conjunction with automatic enrollment can result in both
increased participation rates and increased overall savings levels.167
Initially, some commentators expressed concern that such automatic features would not retain sufficient employee choice to qualify
a plan as a “cash or deferred arrangement.”168 The law, however,
now expressly authorized automatic plan designs.169 Furthermore,
the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) created incentives for employers that sponsor 401(k) plans to implement this approach by
adding safe harbor auto enrollment and auto escalation provisions.170

2. The automatic enrollment and escalation proposal
Because of the proven benefits that automatic features provide,
this Reflection proposes that all employers offering 401(k) plans as
primary retirement savings instruments be required to use automatic enrollment and automatic escalation in their plan design. These
design features have been shown to have significant and positive
impacts on participation and savings levels, even under the most
conservative assumptions.171 Thus, mandating the use of automatic

165. See Butrica & Karamcheva, supra note 162, at 4 (“Employers with auto-enrollment may
be aiming to keep their compensation costs roughly constant. While they end up spending
more on workers who would not have participated without auto-enrollment, they spend less
on workers who would have signed up anyway.”).
166. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
167. BENARTZI, supra note 144, at 118–20 (showing that plans using automatic enrollment
and automatic escalation of contribution percentages are the most effective in ensuring that
workers amass adequate retirement savings); see also VanDerhei & Copeland, supra note 158,
at 5.
168. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 430 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-1(a)(3)(ii) (as
amended in 2009)).
169. Id.
170. See VanDerhei & Copeland, supra note 158, at 6–7 (noting that these safe harbors
preempted any state laws which would have prohibited these automatic plan features).
171. See id. at 1.
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plan provisions in certain qualified 401(k) plans would make these
saving arrangements more effective retirement savings vehicles.172
The benefits from automatic features are numerous. Default settings for savings rates, asset allocation, and incremental increases
significantly simplify the retirement savings process, eliminating the
necessity of workers making complex financial decisions.173 Additionally, because many participants wait several years before enrolling in 401(k) plans, mandatory automatic design would mean that
some workers would begin to save much earlier than they otherwise
would, which positively impacts their retirement security.174 Also,
mandating automatic provisions increases the likelihood that a cross
section of workers will actually receive more meaningful levels of
benefits from the plans that their employers sponsor.
Opponents may argue the proposed mandate is unduly burdensome or excessively paternalistic. However, compliance with an automatic plan design is cost effective and relatively simple. Furthermore, as I argued in the case of mandatory education, requiring employers to take measures to increase plan participation and make the
savings process simpler for employees is a way to justify the substantial tax benefits that employers who sponsor 401(k) plans receive.

C. Additional Tax Advantage Based on Vested Accrued Benefits of
Non-Highly Compensated Workers
As a means of encouraging more meaningful participation of lowand middle-income workers in private retirement plans, and also of
achieving a more equitable distribution of benefits from qualified
plans in today’s retirement savings culture, this Reflection proposes
that an additional tax incentive for retirement savings is offered in
the form of a new employer credit. The proposed credit would be
provided in conjunction with the tax benefits that qualified plans
currently receive.

172. See Jon Vogler, Auto Focus: Voluntary Plans Morphing to Mandatory?, ADVISOR PERSPEC7, 2013), http://advisorperspectives.com/commentaries/invesco_100413.php (noting that automatic provisions are supported by the Obama administration and many members of the investment company industry).
173. See GENE AMROMIN ET AL., FINANCIAL LITERACY AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCIAL
EDUCATION AND COUNSELING: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 2 (2010), http://www.chicagofed.org/
digital_assets/others/region/foreclosure_resource_center/more_financial_literacy.pdf (discussing the problem of financial illiteracy and considering the effectiveness of financial education
programs).
174. See BENARTZI, supra note 144, at 5.
TIVES (Oct.
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1. Current tax advantages of qualified plans
Under current law, the preferential tax treatment of qualified
plans provides three main advantages. First, the employee, or the
beneficiary of the employee, is not subject to taxation until contributions are actually distributed.175 Second, the employer receives an income tax deduction for amounts contributed to the plan at the time
they are made.176 This advantage is an exception to the general rule
that an employer is not permitted to take a tax deduction for salaryrelated expenditures as an ordinary and necessary business expense
before the employee includes the payments in income.177 Third, the
investment earnings on the contributions held by the plan are exempt from taxation.178
Although the tax advantages afforded by qualified plans are not
limited to a specific sector of the population with respect to income,
wealth, or other qualifiers, the domination of 401(k) plans in the private retirement system disproportionately benefits high-income
workers.179 This result occurs, as discussed earlier, because highly
compensated workers are (1) more likely to participate in 401(k)
plans than non-highly compensated workers, (2) more likely to contribute greater percentages of their earnings than non-highly compensated workers, and (3) less likely to forfeit their benefits than
non-highly compensated workers.180 Furthermore, because the progressive tax rate structure of the federal income tax makes deductions and tax deferral more valuable to high-income workers, employers with greater numbers of high-income workers are more likely to offer plans than employers with greater numbers of lowerwage workers. Thus, the employer deductions taken in connection
with 401(k) plans overwhelmingly reflect the retirement benefits ultimately received by highly compensated workers.
Presently, the employers’ deductions for contributions made to
qualified plans are determined without regard to whether or not the
retirement benefits are vested.181 As a result, employers receive the
175. See I.R.C. § 402(a) (2012). If the distribution is rolled over into an IRA or other qualified plan, however, taxation may be further deferred. I.R.C. § 402(c). Generally, rollovers must
be made within sixty days. I.R.C. § 402(c)(3)(A).
176. See I.R.C. § 404(a); see also Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 297.
177. See I.R.C. § 83(h).
178. See I.R.C. § 501(a).
179. See Jefferson, Redistribution, supra note 11, at 294.
180. See EBRI DATABOOK, supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also VANGUARD, supra
note 89 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Section I.C.
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same favorable tax treatment for non-vested contributions as they
do for vested ones, although employees may forfeit their non-vested
accruals if they terminate employment prior to becoming vested. As
discussed earlier, this outcome is more likely to occur in the case of
lower-income workers, who are more likely to leave before becoming fully vested.182
To address this situation, measures should be taken to design tax
incentives that both encourage greater participation among lowand middle-income workers, and also distinguish between vested
and non-vested benefits as a method of achieving a more even distribution of benefits from the private retirement system. The remainder of this Reflection summarizes the basic structure and elements of a proposed employer credit designed to accomplish these
objectives.

2. Basic elements of proposed credit
The proposed incentive is offered in the form of a tax credit rather
than a tax deduction. Although both a tax deduction and a tax credit
can effectively reduce the employer’s income tax liability, their results have very different impacts. Tax deductions reduce taxable income; therefore, the value of a deduction is linked to a taxpayer’s
marginal tax bracket.183 Accordingly, the deductions taken for contributions to qualified plans are more valuable to employers in
higher tax brackets than they are to ones in lower brackets.184 In contrast, because tax credits directly reduce a taxpayer’s tax liability,
they will have the same nominal value for all employers, regardless
of the tax brackets.185 As a result, the credit is effective in providing
more even and widespread incentives for socially desirable behavior.186
The purpose of the proposed incentive is to encourage a wide
range of employers who sponsor 401(k) plans to increase participa182. See supra Section I.C.
183. See Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 343, 352–54 (1989) (referring to tax deductions that favor high-income tax payers as “upsidedown” tax subsidies).
184. See id.
185. See, e.g., Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Policy Basics: Tax Exemptions, Deductions, and
Credits 2 (2013), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/policybasics-exempt.pdf. This is true
as long as the employer’s tax liability is at least equal to the credit.
186. See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Policy Brief No. 156: Reforming Tax Incentives into Uniform Refundable Tax Credits, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 6 (2006), available at http://www.brookings
.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2006/8/taxes%20orszag/pb156.pdf (explaining how tax
credits can be used to encourage more workers to save for retirement).
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tion and benefit distributions among low- and middle-income
workers. Thus, a tax credit is the more appropriate mechanism to
achieve this objective.187
The proposed credit would be available to employers who covered 100% of workers with compensation below a specified amount.
For administrative ease, the income limit for the proposed credit
could be set at levels consistent with those of existing retirement
programs.188 For example, the single-filer income limits for the deductions of contributions to traditional IRAs could be used for this
purpose. Accordingly, the credit would be based on workers with
compensation of $70,000 or less.189
The employer credit for each worker would be calculated as a
fixed percentage of the employee’s vested accrued benefit, determined by total employer contributions made in a given year on behalf of employees with compensation under the specified amount.
Thus, for example, if an employee with income below the specified
dollar limit were 60% vested, and the employer’s contributions in a
given year on her behalf totaled $10,000, the employer credit would
be based on a contribution of $6000 (i.e. 60% of $10,000).
For purposes of calculating the credit, all employer contributions
would be considered, including non-elective and matching contributions. Employee contributions, however, would not be considered in
the calculation of the credit. Accordingly, in the example above, if
the applicable percentage rate for the credit were 50%, the employer’s credit on behalf of that particular worker would equal $3000 (i.e.
50% of $6000).
As a method of targeting lower-income workers and also limiting
lost revenue, the proposed employer credit would phase out as
workers’ incomes increased. Therefore, the largest credits would be
given for workers with the lowest incomes, and the smallest credits
would be given for workers with the highest incomes. To illustrate,
if the single-filer, phase out limits for deductions to traditional IRAs
were used, the maximum employer credit would be given for workers with compensation of $60,000 or less.190 The credits for workers
187. See Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, supra note 185.
188. Obviously, the limits could be determined on other bases as well.
189. See 2014 IRA Contribution and Deduction Limits, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/
Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/2014--IRA-Contribution-and-Deduction-Limits
---Effect-of-Modified-AGI-on-Deductible-Contributions-If-You-ARE-Covered-by-a-Retirement
-Plan-at-Work (last updated Feb. 19, 2014).
190. See id. (allowing only a partial deduction for IRA contributions when income is greater than $60,000 but less than $70,000).
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with compensation of more than $60,000 would begin to phase out.
Once the compensation of a worker reached $70,000, the credit
would be completely phased out. Thus, in the above example, if the
employee had compensation of $60,000, the employer would receive
the full credit of $3000. If the employee had compensation of
$65,000, the employer would receive a credit of $1500. If the employee had compensation of $70,000, the employer would receive no
credit at all in connection with that employee. The phase out would
be indexed for inflation, so that the phase out ranges would remain
fixed in real terms.191
The specific numbers and ranges used above are offered for illustrative purposes only. The use of revenue and cost estimates could
result in the selection of different income limits and phase outs. The
essence of the proposal is not the selected numbers, but rather the
concept of an employer credit based on the vested accrued benefits
of low- and middle-income workers.
The proposed employer credit would appear to advance pension
policy by increasing retirement security among low- and middleincome workers, and also fiscal policy by tailoring the tax subsidy to
benefits actually received by the targeted population. Furthermore,
the structure of this proposal appears to be politically viable in the
current retirement savings environment because it motivates employers to voluntarily broaden coverage among low- and middleincome workers, rather than mandating it.

CONCLUSION
The shift from the use of defined benefit plans to 401(k) plans as
primary retirement savings instruments occurring since the passage
of ERISA has not improved participation rates in the private retirement system. In fact, because of the structure of these plans, there is
greater variance among taxpayers in different income groups regarding plan participation and benefit distribution than ever before. Additionally, the heavy use of 401(k) plans has challenged traditional
views regarding the allocation of risk associated with retirement savings because 401(k) plans make it necessary for workers, rather than
employers, to make critical financial and investment decisions at every stage of the retirement savings process. Thus, the trend of using

191. See, Jim Chen, The Price of Macroeconomic Imprecision: How Should the Law Measure Inflation?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1375, 1406–07 (2003) (noting that many provisions in the federal tax
code are indexed to account for inflation).
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401(k) plans as primary retirement vehicles has significantly changed
the retirement savings culture and has created a need to develop new
and different ways of increasing participation and contribution levels
in 401(k) plans, particularly among low- and middle-income workers.
Requiring employers that sponsor 401(k) plans to provide investment education programs, and to use automatic plan designs, responds to these challenges without unduly burdening employers.
Research shows that the use of both approaches—financial education and automatic plan design—positively impacts the participation and savings rates among all workers. Accordingly, these proposals address numerous concerns regarding the effectiveness of the
use of 401(k) plans as primary retirement savings vehicles in the
private pension system.
The proposed employer credit specifically targets the problem of
low participation and contribution levels in 401(k) plans among lowand middle-income workers. The proposed credit advances pension
policy in numerous ways. First, it is cost efficient, as the tax subsidy is
linked to the benefits of low- and middle-income workers only—
presumably the workers who are unable to save on their own. Second, the proposed credit is more effective, as it measures the eligible
contributions on the bases of vested accrued benefits that are more
likely to be received as retirement benefits by the targeted population
than are non-vested benefits. Third, the proposed credit encourages
broader participation and benefit distribution in 401(k) plans, which
increases the overall fairness of the private retirement system. Additional incentives, such as these three proposals, will not provide retirement security for all workers, but will go a long way in ensuring
that more workers actually benefit from their employer-sponsored
plans.

